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As litigation costs rapidly rise, the United States needs a just and effective,
but lower-cost, manner to resolve disputes. For years, arbitration has been that
alternative Unfortunately, recent disagreement among the circuits on the
scope of arbitrators' authority to compel testimony or document production as
conferred by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)2 threatens to undermine the
desirability and efficacy of arbitration resolution.' When there is uncertainty as
to the ability of parties to obtain and analyze information prior to a hearing,
contracting parties may perceive arbitration as an unjust or ineffective manner
for resolving disputes, and thus will likely not opt in to arbitration
proceedings. This may be particularly acute in industries, such as health
insurance or reinsurance, in which critical information often resides with
nonparties. As parties shift from arbitration to litigation, the overall costs of
enforcing their contracts will increase, which will cause the gains from each
contract to fall, suggesting that the marginal contract will not be made. To
keep arbitration as an effective mode of dispute resolution and maximize the
number of efficient contracts made, this procedural issue must be resolved.
Congress must take action to clarify the scope of arbitrators' authority and
empower them to issue enforceable nonparty subpoenas for prehearing
1. For an overview of the criticisms leveled against arbitration, see David Sherwyn, Because It
Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail To Fix the Problems
Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. i,
22-30 (2003).
2. 9 U.S.C. 5 7 (2000).
3. See, e.g., W. Scott Simpson & Omer Kesikli, The Contours of Arbitration Discovery, 67 ALA.
LAW. 280 (2006).
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proceedings. Although either creative contracting or a Supreme Court opinion
could resolve this dispute, Congress is best positioned to balance the desire that
parties reach the ideal outcome with the need not to overburden nonparties,
while preserving the relaxed procedural requirements that make arbitration
appealing.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
To fully understand the need for congressional action, one must first
understand the doctrinal difficulties of § 7, which states, "The arbitrators ...
may summon.., any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness
and.., to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper which
may be deemed material as evidence in the case."4 As mentioned above, the
circuit courts have disagreed on the correct interpretation of this language.
The Third Circuit in Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp. held that
arbitrators have no authority to compel nonparties to produce documents prior
to arbitration hearings.' Then-Judge Alito noted, "An arbitrator's authority
over parties that are not contractually bound by the arbitration agreement is
strictly limited to that granted by the Federal Arbitration Act." 6 To understand
the scope of authority the FAA created, the court stated, "we must, of course,
begin with the text."7 Using this textual approach, the court interpreted the
phrase "to attend before them.., and.., to bring with him or them any book"
to "speak[] unambiguously to the issue., 8 The court held that the careful use of
the phrase "to bring with him" applies only to items physically brought with
the nonparty to a hearing before the arbitrators, "not to situations in which the
items are simply sent or brought by a courier."9 The court also noted that the
drafters' use of "and" unambiguously limits the arbitrator's subpoena power to
situations in which the nonparty will appear before the arbitration panel.1" To
support its holding that the drafting reflects some intention to limit the
subpoena power of arbitrators, the court highlighted several state statutes that
provided equally unambiguous authorization of such power." Based on these
4. 9 U.S.C. § 7.
5. 360 F.3d 404, 411 (3 d Cir. 2004).
6. Id. at 406.
7. Id.
S. Id. at 407.
9. Id.
10. Id.
ii. See id. at 407 n.1.
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pieces of evidence, the Third Circuit concluded that the text unambiguously
did not authorize any discovery subpoena power for arbitrators.
Despite the "unambiguous text" of § 7, the Eighth Circuit came to a
different result when presented with a similar question.12 In In re Security Life,
the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that § 7 "does not.., explicitly authorize the
arbitration panel to require the production of the documents for inspection by
a party."13 Nevertheless, it held that there was an implicit power to subpoena
documents for discovery.1 4 Unlike the Third Circuit, which restricted its
interpretation to the text, the Eighth Circuit drew on the goal of efficiency in
dispute resolution. The court conceded that "the efficient resolution of disputes
through arbitration necessarily entails a limited discovery process," but it also
recognized that "this interest in efficiency is furthered by permitting a party to
review and digest relevant documentary evidence prior to the arbitration
hearing.""5 After announcing this holding, the court suggested in dicta that this
implicit power was appropriately used in this particular case because "[the
nonparty] is not a mere bystander pulled into this matter arbitrarily, but is a
party to the contract that is at the root of the dispute."' 6
Intermediately, the Fourth Circuit in COMSAT Corp. v. National Science
Foundation held that courts may enforce arbitral subpoenas for prehearing
proceedings only in the case of demonstrated "special need."" Like the Third
Circuit, the court in COMSAT began with a strong textual approach. The court
found, by § 7's own terms, that "the FAA's subpoena authority is defined as the
12. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Duncanson & Holt, Inc. (In re Sec. Life Ins. Co.), 228 F.3 d 865, 870-71
(8th Cir. 2ooo). The Eighth Circuit nearly addressed the distinction between arbitrators'
authority to compel document production and deposition attendance. The court, however,
vacated the question as moot because the party challenging the subpoena had already
complied with the request. Id. at 870. No other circuit court has squarely answered this
question. Some district court opinions and commentators agree that there is a significant
qualitative difference between requests for prehearing document production and
depositions. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co. (In re Proctor & Gamble Co.), No.
02-5480, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26025 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003); Simpson & Kesikli, supra
note 3. The Fourth Circuit in COMSAT Corp. v. National Science Foundation, 19o F.3d 269
(4 th Cir. 1999), however, made no distinctions between depositions and document
production. Id. at 275. Because the text of § 7 makes no distinction and no court has
definitively answered this question, this Comment treats the analysis of subpoenas for
depositions and document production as the same.
13. Security Life Insurance Co., 228 F. 3d at 870-71.
14. Id.
is. Id. at 870.
16. Id. at 871.
17. 19o F.3 d at 276.
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power of the arbitration panel to compel nonparties to appear 'before them';
that is, to compel testimony by nonparties at the arbitration hearing. ', 8 The
court suggested that the logic for limiting these powers is clear: when parties
agree to settle their disputes by arbitration, they exchange some procedural
niceties for a more efficient dispute resolution.19 For the Fourth Circuit, a
"hallmark of arbitration -and a necessary precursor to its efficient operation -
is a limited discovery process."2 Although the Fourth Circuit stated that both
the text and underlying policy goal of efficient dispute resolution suggest
extremely limited subpoena powers for prehearing discovery in arbitration, the
court also acknowledged that some discovery might be needed since "in a
complex case..., the much-lauded efficiency of arbitration will be degraded if
the parties are unable to review and digest relevant evidence prior to the
arbitration hearing."2' The court then suggested that in cases of "special need,"
which the court declined to define, some subpoena power might be
warranted.'
II. RESOLVING THE DISPUTE
To resolve the doctrinal dispute, there are several options of varying
attractiveness, including more robust private law arrangements, a final judicial
determination by the Supreme Court, and a statutory amendment.
Strong private law agreements could alleviate much of the difficulty
regarding uncertainty about arbitrators' authority. When entering agreements,
contracting parties could require that each side agree to provide all relevant
information should one of the parties enter arbitration with any third party.23
Under these circumstances, any dispute over the provision of information
would be an issue of contractual, rather than statutory, interpretation. 4
Despite the institutional simplicity of this solution, however, it is largely
unworkable because few parties would agree to be bound by contract terms
iB. Id. at 275.




23. Parties can ensure a right to discovery if this is clearly outlined in their arbitration clause. See
Roseann Oliver & Frederic T. Knape, Illinois Arbitrations: Pre-Hearing Discovery and the Right
to a Full and Fair Hearing, CHI. ASS'N REc., Sept. 1999, at 32, 32.
24. If this contract includes an arbitration clause, any disputed interpretation of that contract
would fall under the terms of that arbitration clause.
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subjecting them to potentially significant unforeseeable duties. One could
argue that if all parties agree to assist in arbitrations, the savings to a given
company when another assists in its arbitration proceeding would
counterbalance the costs to that company of assisting in the current arbitration
proceeding. While this argument has a theoretical appeal, in practice a given
company enters only a small portion of the contracts made, and therefore may
never need significant assistance. For a risk-averse contracting party, this
uncertainty will likely be unacceptable."5 Even a risk-neutral contracting party
would be wary of agreeing to a contract term that, because of the uncertainty
around it, would be difficult to price.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court could resolve the dispute among the
circuits.26 While this would unquestionably end the debate as to the correct
interpretation of § 7, the predominant modes of statutory interpretation -
textualism and purposivism -limit the Court. If the Supreme Court took a
textual approach, it likely would hold similarly to the Third Circuit in Hay and
narrowly interpret § 7. Alternatively, if the Court took a policy-minded
purposivist approach, it might rely on what it has recognized as the "emphatic
federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution" and interpret the powers
under § 7 more broadly. 7 These outcomes are fundamentally inconsistent with
one another. A narrow interpretation runs counter to a recognized federal
policy, but remains true to the text, while the broad interpretation runs afoul of
the unambiguous textual meaning in deference to an overarching policy goal.
The idea that the Court would choose one set of values over another is not
problematic; what is troubling is that it is the methods of statutory
interpretation, rather than some reasoned approach, that would determine
which values win."8 When the method determines the outcome, there is always
25. Cf PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 207
(1992) ("Efficient contracts balance the costs of risk bearing against the incentive gains that
result."). If parties cannot understand the scope of that risk, they cannot effectively balance
it; thus they cannot make efficient contracts.
26. Recent commentary predicts that the Court will need to resolve the dispute, though there
has been no analysis of how the Court should go about doing so. See Simpson & Kesikli,
supra note 3, at 284.
27. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985); see, e.g.,
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (describing the general policy to favor private
arbitration agreements).
28. This is setting aside the debate over the judiciary's authority to weigh competing values. For
a very brief overview of this debate, see Walter Berns, Government by Lauyers & judges,
COMMENTARY, June 1987, at 17; and Richard A. Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant?, NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23, 25.
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some fear of circularity, that is, that the desired outcome will determine which
method is used. Although the interpretation of any ambiguous statute is
vulnerable to this critique, it is particularly problematic for § 7. By broadly
construing arbitrators' abilities to issue subpoenas, and thus the judiciary's
authority to enforce them, the Court would effectively engage in jurisdictional
aggrandizement.2 9 More problematically, the two approaches to statutory
interpretation mentioned above create polar results, either extremely restrictive
or permissive. The best resolution, however, is likely a more nuanced middle
ground.3" Unfortunately, the textualist and policy-minded methods of
statutory interpretation cannot be combined to reach this optimal solution.
Simply put, considering policy undermines textual analysis. Although an
intermediate solution is preferable, the Court does not have the interpretive
tools to reach this solution.
Because the Supreme Court is not well-positioned to resolve the dispute in
a manner consistent with both statutory meaning and public policy, Congress
should amend the statute so that a reasonable interpretation reflects reasonable
policy. As the Third Circuit noted in Hay, several states have modified the
Uniform Arbitration Act3' so that arbitrators in those states have more
expansive powers. Delaware, for example, modified the Act to state, "The
arbitrators may compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
books, records, contracts, papers, accounts, and all other documents and
evidence, and shall have the power to administer oaths."32 Similarly,
Pennsylvania added, "The arbitrators may issue subpoenas in the form
prescribed by general rules for the attendance of witnesses and for the
production of books, records, documents, and other evidence."33 Congress
could use similar language to modify § 7. Using such language unquestionably
would clarify the powers granted by the FAA, but it leaves minimization of the
29. Compare this to issues of judicial deference to agency interpretations. Commentators argue
that courts should not grant Chevron deference to jurisdictional determinations by agencies.
See, e.g., Ernest Gelhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO
L. REV. 989,992-93 (1999).
30. The Court could certainly take the Fourth Circuit's approach, which was the most nuanced
of the three cited above, but the text of the FAA does not contain an idea of "special need."
COMSAT Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 19o F. 3d 269, 271 (4 th Cir. 1999). Also, since the
Fourth Circuit effectively punted and refused to define "special need," id., the Court would
be forced to define this term, which again, would look much like a job for the legislature.
31. UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr, 7 U.L.A. 1 (2005).
32. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 1O, § 57o8(a) (1999).
33. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5 7309(a) (West 2007).
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potentially substantial third-party effects that a large discovery request might
bring completely at the individual arbitrator's discretion.
Alternatively, Congress could create a reasonableness standard. 4 For
example, the statute could be amended to include the sentence, "Similarly,
these arbitrators may summon in writing any person to attend a deposition or
produce any book, record, document, or paper prior to a hearing before the
panel, if the request is reasonable." The wording is not critical, but the
inclusion of a reasonableness requirement is essential.
Under this modified § 7, the procedure for obtaining a subpoena would be
clear. Parties would request that the arbitrators subpoena specific documents or
witnesses. If the arbitrators deemed this request reasonable, they would grant
the subpoena. Several factors should be essential in the reasonableness inquiry.
First, the arbitrators would consider the importance of the information sought.
Arbitrators would be more likely to grant requests for critical documents, such
as policy documents or claims forms, than for more tangential documents.
Additionally, the relationship between the party and nonparty would be
important. Arbitrators would be reluctant to authorize onerous requests if the
party is "a mere bystander pulled into this matter arbitrarily," but not if it "is a
party to the contract that is the root of the dispute. 35 Finally, the degree of
burden placed on the nonparty would be critical. More burdensome requests
would receive closer scrutiny than less burdensome requests. When these
factors are considered in concert, arbitrators would authorize subpoenas for the
most important, foreseeable, and not overly burdensome requests, thus
ensuring that most essential information is available before the hearing, while
protecting nonparties from substantial, unforeseeable requests.
This proposal is subtly different from the state modifications of the
Uniform Arbitration Act mentioned above 6 and better protects third-party
interests. Rather than grant widespread authorization to subpoena documents
and witnesses, this proposed modification only authorizes reasonable requests.
To avoid unreasonable requests, the state statutes rely solely on the discretion
of the arbitrators, whereas the proposed modification creates a clear standard
of review of the arbitrator's decisions. Under a modified § 7, any party to the
arbitration or third party subject to the subpoena could challenge the
34. For another proponent of allowing reasonable prehearing subpoenas, see Oliver & Knape,
supra note 23. Note that these authors argue that some prehearing subpoenas are needed to
ensure the fairness and efficacy of arbitration, but do not provide any criteria for
determining which subpoenas to enforce. Id. at 36-37.
35. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Duncanson & Holt, Inc. (In re Sec. Life Ins. Co.), 228 F.3d 865, 871 (8th
Cir. 2000).
36. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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arbitrators' decision in court, and the statute would provide the judges with
guidance on the scope of arbitrators' authority. Because of the clear standard of
review included in the statute, courts and arbitrators would authorize some
prehearing discovery, but sufficiently maintain the relevant third-party
interests of not being overburdened by other parties' disputes.
Admittedly, drafting a reasonableness standard creates some additional
difficulties. First, litigation would ensue as courts defined "reasonable." The
courts likely would determine that "reasonableness" is dependent on the
specific facts and circumstances of the dispute, which would require that all
disputes over the reasonableness of a subpoena be brought before a court for
that inquiry. Additionally, residual uncertainty as to the ability to obtain
certain information in the prehearing phase would remain. This may
discourage some parties from choosing arbitration as their preferred mode of
dispute resolution. Finally, even a reasonableness standard could burden some
nonparties with significant duties to testify or produce documents prior to an
arbitration hearing.
Although these are valid criticisms, they are less problematic than they
initially appear because structural similarities within the industries most in
need of nonparty information will allow courts to define the contours of a
reasonableness standard quickly. The insurance industry, for example, is one in
which information from nonparties is critically important. Although the
insurance industry is diverse, there are structural similarities among simple
automobile insurance, more complex health insurance, and very complex
commercial catastrophic insurance; in all areas of the industry, critical
information often resides with reinsurers or third-party claims administrators.
This similarity eases the implementation of a reasonableness standard because
certain relationships, such as insurer to reinsurer, or policyholder to claims
administrator, will be defined as either a reasonable or unreasonable basis for
discovery requests. In most cases, parties will accept that their relationship is
structurally similar enough to the relationship in the initial case and comply
with the subpoena. Certainly, some will contest the subpoenas, but frequently
these will be cases with particularly burdensome requests or tenuous
relationships. For the majority of cases, it will be less costly to comply with a
request to produce documents than to contest the subpoena in court, especially
when the relationship in question has already been defined as sufficiently close
to merit enforcing a subpoena. Because the courts will quickly draw the
boundaries of the reasonableness standard, the costs of implementing such a
standard will decrease, as will the uncertainty among contracting parties as to
the ability to obtain critical documents from nonparties. While even requests
deemed reasonable may place significant burdens on some nonparties, this is
largely unavoidable. One consolation is that, with a well-defined standard,
1566
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parties entering agreements to fill some role that would subject them to
arbitration discovery subpoenas will have advance knowledge of this fact and
will price the expected cost of complying with arbitration-based discovery
requests into their contracts.
CONCLUSION
Because the current wording of 7 is unclear, the fairness and efficacy of
arbitration is in jeopardy. Without a lower-cost, yet effective, alternative to
litigation, parties may be reluctant to enter relationships that could require
dispute resolution. Private law arrangements could alleviate the consequences
of this ambiguity, but the artful drafting and negotiating required for this
outcome renders it an unlikely solution. Alternatively, the Supreme Court
could resolve the dispute among the circuits, but its best interpretive tools
cannot reach the nuanced, intermediate solution that is needed. To solve this
problem and secure arbitration's place as the lower-cost alternative to
litigation, Congress should take action to clarify the scope of arbitrators'
authority to issue prehearing subpoenas. To balance optimally the interests of
the parties inside and outside the arbitration proceeding, Congress should
authorize arbitrators to issue subpoenas for reasonable prehearing discovery.
ANNE B. O'HAGEN
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